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Abstract— MANIAC Challenge raises a problem of game 
theory, different players strategies intertwine and the success of 
any player is dependent on the actions of all players in the 
system. A truly fair scenario is when all the strategies are 
identical, all the nodes co-operate and they all equally share the 
rewards and risks that come with every transfer. A successful 
strategy is one that tries to diverge from the equilibrium to 
maximize its own gains and it manages to do so. We propose the 
wolf-pack strategy. Unlike standard game-theory based 
strategies, our strategy does not penalize the nodes that diverge 
from fairness or from equilibrium, as we believe most nodes will 
do so in an attempt to get an advantage over the other nodes. The 
wolf-pack strategy will try to always find the most successful 
node or nodes and penalize them. We believe that just like in 
nature, a number of small predators can take down the bigger, 
more profitable ones. Furthermore during the Challenge we test 
two different strategies that provide completely opposite results. 
These offer a clear picture of what the best strategy is and the 
problems of the current system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The MANIAC Challenge raises a number of interesting 
problems for ad-hoc networks: Can an ad-hoc network be a 
viable alternative for the currently used infrastructure-based 
networking? If infrastructure owners will use an ad-hoc 
network to off-load some of its traffic to have a more efficient 
overall network, how will the nodes in the ad-hoc network 
respond? What is a fair payment method for the nodes in the 
ad-hoc network? What are the risks that some nodes will abuse 
this new network to maximize its own profit? 
In such a game, with every node trying to maximize its own 
profit the used strategies will intertwine making the end result 
extremely difficult to predict. 
Based on previous competitions and the rules offered the 
following assumptions can be made:  Most nodes, if not all will 
act in a rational way, trying to maximize its individual profit 
while still playing in a fair way so that they will not be 
eliminated from the network; Most nodes will try to stay as 
close as possible to the Nash Equilibrium [1, 2] while still 
trying to manipulate the numbers in their own favor; The entire 
network topology is known at all times through the OLSR 
protocol[4]; At all times at least one node will be connected 
with the wired backbone; Nodes will want close to complete 
fairness both in the rewards offered and the risk taken in the 
form of fines. 
The idea of using mobile nodes to decongest the main 
infrastructure is clearly an important path to consider for the 
future of our networks and has been explored in various articles 
like [5].  Observing how multiple strategies work in such an 
environment is the first step in this direction. The possibility 
that one could abuse the network and create even worse 
performance needs to further be explored through contests of 
this type. 
II. FAIRNESS IN THE AD-HOC NETWORK  
We strongly believe that all nodes participating in 
forwarding will act in a rational manner based on the Nash 
Equilibrium [1, 2] and as such the nodes in the network will 
behave fairly. 
We define fairness [3] in the case of the MANIAC 
Challenge as the state when all nodes from source to the 
destination will equally split the profit and the fine needed to 
be paid if the packet is not delivered. In the case of bidding 
fairness would be achieved by always letting the node that is 
part of the shortest path win. As such the overall profit of all 
the nodes in the network will be maximized, extracting the 
largest possible amount from the back-bone infrastructure. 
Small deviations from fairness are accepted as this would 
permit differentiation in the bidding process. 
If all nodes are expected to act fair it is easy to observe that 
the nodes that are unfair, or bad, will be penalized both through 
packet drop and forcing them to pay part of the fine or through 
refusal to let them win bids, even if their offer is a lot better 
than others. 
In our proposed strategy we take advantage of this behavior 
by assisting bad nodes and penalizing rich nodes. 
III. THE WOLF-PACK STRATEGY 
We propose the Wolf-pack strategy, a novel way to 
approach the MANIAC Challenge. In this strategy we observe 
2 key features and make decisions based on them: the network 
topology and the individual node behavior based on the 
network topology. 
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 The network topology can be obtained through OLSR and 
it is available at any moment. It is important to be aware of the 
network topology, as it directly affects the reward each node 
should receive if the transactions are completely fair. By taking 
the node topology into consideration certain advantageous 
positions can be recognized and exploited, such as being the 
only node that can bid for a packet and thus modifying the 
strategy accordingly. 
Individual node behavior is extremely important for our 
strategy. We need to make assumptions about how rich a node 
is and we do this by observing all transactions and calculating 
its profit at every point. We also need to observe how each 
node behaves, since a “bad” node can prove extremely useful. 
Information about individual nodes should be exchanged 
between our 2 friendly nodes to get a more accurate image of 
the entire network. We presume we can make our observations 
by packet sniffing but a solution in the case this is not possible 
is offered in section VI. 
We believe that bad or unfair nodes will be penalized by all 
other nodes and as such their chances to win the challenge are 
greatly diminished. This nodes do not prove to be a direct 
challenge for us as such we will help them: if such a node bids 
for our packet and does not have an extreme tendency to drop 
packets discovered in the past we will prefer it as the next hop; 
If it has a package and wants to forward it, we will offer bids 
that give him a larger reward then and thus winning the bid and 
receiving the packet. As such we will increase our own number 
of delivered packages as we will take advantage of nodes other 
would not consider and we make sure the distribution of 
reward is spread across more nodes. This helps us in assuring 
that no node will collect a large number of rewards. 
Next we will penalize the rich nodes. By observing the 
network we decide which are the nodes that manage to make a 
big profit so far and we chose other nodes to forward our 
packets. This is where the wolf-pack name comes in, we share 
the value of the profit we believe all other nodes have and 
directly attack the nodes with the most profit by not choosing 
them as forwarders and by dropping packets in an attempt to 
force them to pay big fines. 
 
Fig 1 Bids arranged by Hop count and Maximum allowed bid matching them 
 
By applying the two rules we prefer bad and poor nodes 
over rich and fair nodes in both bidding and forwarding, in the 
case of bidding we can go to the extra length of making a good 
bid and dropping the packet just to force the rich node to pay 
part of the fines. Based on this observations we order the bids 
we get based on the price offers we receive, the level of profit 
the node has and the node behavior from the past and we 
choose the most advantageous for us to disseminate the total 
network profit as equally over as many nodes as possible while 
keeping ourselves just a bit more above anyone so we do not 
become a clear target for other nodes. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
To implement our strategy we require the four following 
metrics: 
 Node richness – this is observed over time by listening 
to bid win messages and determining the profit for 
every node. 
 Node Fairness – it is computed by determining if the 
amount kept by a node is the expected one or if it 
deviates. 
 Topology – is provided by the OLSR protocol. 
 Bid data – provided per individual. 
Out of the 4 metrics only the last one is considered to 
always be accurate. The Topology changes at a very high rate 
and we can’t expect it to be up to date at every point, 
furthermore we are only provided with the 1 hop and 2 hop 
neighbors. The fairness and richness of individual nodes can 
only be accurate if we receive all the messages in the network; 
this is not the case, we only receive the 1 hop messages. 
For each of this metrics a sorted list is created containing 
every node that made a bid for our current packet. We prefer 
small values for richness, topology distance to the destination 
using the given node, bid offered by the node and its fairness. 
This matches what we described in the previous section. These 
4 lists are then combined using a weight for each list and the 
best node is chosen as the next one for our packet. 
When we make a bid we try to predict what the other nodes 
will bid and bid less. However we don’t want to make bids that 
are too low. We use historical data of the network and when we 
receive a bid request we make the smallest bid compared to the 
past bids made by the other participating nodes taking into 
account the similarity with the previous bids. 
To achieve this we only choose the past bids that are closer 
than a distance Ɛ to our current scenario. The distance is 
calculated by sorting all the bids in a graph according to 
Maximum allowed Bid and Hop count to the current bid as can 
be observed in Fig. 1. 
This method is especially important considering during the 
contest we noticed a lot of bids with the value 0. This has led 
us to believe that some algorithms chose the smallest bid 
possible at all times and converged on 0. The method we used 
guarantees that as long as there are not too many bids of 0 our 
strategy would still make useful bids while bidding the smallest 
one if possible. 
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In a real life scenario the algorithm can be extended by only 
keeping a history of the last N number of bids we saw or by 
limiting the history to the last x minutes. 
V. CHANGES DURING THE CONTEST 
In the first round our algorithm managed to rank third. 
Because we wanted to get to the first position we decided to 
make dramatic changes to guarantee that we make a profit. We 
tried two additional strategies.  
One was to always bid 1 and keep the part of the algorithm 
that dealt with who receives a packet that we already have. We 
expected this to work because we observed many bids of 0 and 
we hoped that we could deprecate the network fast enough that 
only we would make profit whenever we managed to win a 
packet. This strategy further guarantees that we would receive 
a large number of packets at the start. 
The strategy ranked last. This happened because of the 
large fines; the large fines guaranteed that if one bids too low 
he will lose a lot of points. 
Our next and final strategy was based on the observations 
we made in the previous rounds. First we wanted to keep the 
bids high. Next we wanted to get only the messages that are 
guaranteed to be delivered, thus avoiding any fines. To achieve 
this meant bidding according to the Wolf-pack strategy, but 
only when we are 1 hop away from the destination. A variation 
could have been to only bid a value of 1. 
Because of the way the API was build one had to always 
bid, even when this was not wanted, first we tried to beat this 
system by always bidding max bid, but even like this the fines 
were too large and we did not manage to make a profit. Then 
we observed a problem we had in the first version. 
Because of the way we calculated our bids and the large 
amount of time it took to do so we were missing a lot of bids. 
First we saw this as a problem and it resulted in the second 
version where we always bid 1. But now with a clear picture 
we saw it as an advantage. We knew at this point that the only 
guaranteed way to make a profit was to only bid when we were 
next to the destination. When this was not the case we wanted 
not to play, we wanted to delay the bid as much as possible. 
The problem introduced by the first algorithm with the big 
delay was now an advantage. We knew how to delay the 
messages, how to reliably participate in the bidding process 
only when it brought us a profit. 
We delayed the bid as much as possible and then started a 
large processing to assure that every bid we didn’t want to 
make would time out. The bids that were guaranteed to give us 
profit were executed as fast as possible by keeping a reduced 
history or by randomly bidding a very small value. At this 
point we could only make profit. This final strategy threw us in 
the first place for the last round.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
In the case we cannot sniff the network to obtain data of 
what bids other nodes have made or who won a bid we propose 
the following strategy: We keep a history of all bids; when we 
find ourselves in a bid against the same other nodes we apply a 
binary search method. We bid the center between the lowest 
possible bid and the highest, if we win the next time we bid the 
center between the highest possible bid and the previous center; 
if we do not win we bid the center between our bid and the 
possible lowest. We continue to bid as such until we find the 
bid each other node makes and the strategy they play. We 
compare each bid with the strategy we believe the other nodes 
can play in an attempt to find the strategy and the level of 
fairness they are at. 
During the contest we were able to obtain all the data and 
this was not required. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented the wolf-pack strategy. This 
strategy aims to win the MANIAC Challenge by attacking the 
rich nodes and helping the poor and even the bad nodes in the 
network. During the contest we observed that the initial 
strategy was successful only in a small majority of cases 
obtaining a rank of 3. We implemented and executed 2 new 
strategies during the contest. These 2 strategies obtained us the 
last and first place and gave us an important insight into the 
entire goal of the MANIAC Challenge, off-loading data to the 
nodes. Even though the last strategy shows that the system can 
indeed be tricked, we believe that with small modifications to 
the rules data off-loading can provide a future of congestion 
free networks. From our experience more study in the way the 
fine affects the network or how the Time-To-Live limits the 
number of successfully delivered messages is required. We 
believe different methods of applying the fine or by removing 
it all together could bring completely different results. 
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